# Aff

## FW

### Extinction First

#### Existential threats outweigh

GPP 17

Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### Consequentialism Good

#### Refusing to assume responsibility for the consequences of their [ontological/epistemological/whatever] starting point enables political disaster—their args about ontological entanglement with the rest of the world prove this

Zanotti 17

Associate Professor Department of Political Science, Virginia Tech (Laura, “Reorienting IR: Ontological Entanglement, Agency, and Ethics,” International Studies Review, January 13, 2017

In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are interlinked. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. This worldview invites a reconsideration of the way we justify and address political decisions and ethical action beyond the universalism supported by atomistic ontologies and the stifling limits imposed by substantialist-structuralism. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles rings hollow… In such a world, positional ethics is the best we can hope for” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission). A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a profound sense of modesty, as well as for the central role of responsibility for taking political decisions. In an entangled world that is not governed by theoretically detectable, linear, and immutable laws of history, but instead by intra-agential processes, the conditions of possibility for political agency are rooted in the morphogenetic properties of practices. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, ethical guidelines may not be grounded on abstractions stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind. Prudence, responsibility, and practices of cultivation of the self offer pathways to overcome the limitations of the Kantian categorical imperative by which universal prescriptions are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, universalism may elicit exclusionary and violent practices. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by linear relations of causality and characterized by certainty and stability may be the root of fundamentalism. Furthermore, if we accept Barad’s position that we are “of the world” and not above the world, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with performative political effects than a quest for the discovery of the “true nature” of what exists. Therefore, intellectual undertakings are a form of political agency and come with great responsibility. Such responsibility requires the need for exercising prudence in making truth statements about what is universally good or naturally inevitable. Assumptions about linearity of causal relations, universal laws of history, or ontological properties of entities yield two problematic effects. On the one hand, they may stifle political imagination; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon abstract prescriptions rather than upon careful diagnosis of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, there are no externalities. Arguments that divert responsibility by basing political choices upon abstract principles or aspirations and, as a result, that treat what happens on the ground as “unintended consequences” or “collateral damage,” are ethically thin and politically dangerous. In fact, unintended consequences may well be the result of irresponsible political decision-making that does not include a competent assessment of the practical configurations that constitute the context of action and the means necessary to achieve stated goals. Such attitudes, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, have led to disastrous initiatives, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that the bland rhetoric of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) produces the effect of diverting responsibility from those who conduct war while assuaging their consciences concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that as a result of the preference for universal normativity, the human rights profession (which he calls “the invisible college”) is more concerned with protecting abstract norms than with acting politically so as to devise viable solutions to specific problems. Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014). Significantly, the lack of prudence that derives from broad overgeneralizations and reliance on abstractions, rather than careful consideration of what the case demands, threatens more self-defeating outcomes in peacekeeping and international politics. This is why a careful reflection of the ways our political choices are validated ontologically and epistemologically is of paramount practical importance. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of these positions, Carr pointed out, lead to self-defeating outcomes and stifle political imagination because they focus on general abstractions, failing to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity actually obtain in specific historical configurations. Here I have proposed that an ontology of entanglement fosters an ethic of engagement and activism along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, what qualifies as meaningful agency is not stifled by the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by the inescapable features of an oppressive and alienating social order that dispossess subjects of their humanity and reduces them to “bare life” (as in Agamben). Instead, micropolitical interventions, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, while not revolutionizing the status quo, may be relevant to triggering social change. Importantly, ontologies of entanglement also raise the bar for adjudicating the ethical validity of political choices. Radical assumption of responsibility drastically limits what is acceptable as “unintended consequences.” This is important for the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for the way politicians decide to wage war. Ethically and politically sound decision-making cannot be based mainly upon the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, abstract aspirations, or overarching theories of the functioning of society. They must also include careful analysis of how clusters of causes may generate effects in the specific contexts at hand and take responsibility for the ontological cuts our initiatives operate and for the morphogenetic processes they may set off.

## Links

### NATO Good – Gendermen

#### No link—NATO’s WPS agenda has disrupted gender hierarchies

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “NATO, women, and gendermen.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 95-96. LJS

And yet, engaging in gender work can offer opportunities for a more ‘genderconscious’ masculinity to develop (Hurley, 2018a). In Chapter 1, we highlight how change in institutions of hegemonic masculinity is, at least theoretically, possible. In her discussion of change in hegemonic masculinity, Duncanson (2013, 2015) highlights the dangers of dismissing any form of positive change in the way men construct, understand and enact their masculinities as simply the ‘flexibility of the machinery of rule’ (Duncanson, 2015: 232). Positive change is not always co-option, and as Connell and Messerschmidt (2005: 840) argue, the concept of hegemonic masculinity was never meant to mean a ‘toxic assemblage’ of negative traits: though, as we have discussed, co-option and hybridisation can be ways in which particular forms of masculinity retain their hegemonic status (Messner, 2007; Demetriou, 2001). Duncanson argues that positive change and the ‘unravelling of hegemonic masculinity’ is possible and that it must begin with men being encouraged: not so much to change their ways as to change the way in which they negotiate their identities in relation to others. Rather than forge their identities through relations of opposition or domination, men and subjects in general need to construct their identities through recognition of similarity, respect, interdependence, empathy and equality with others. (Duncanson 2015: 233, emphasis in original) There was evidence of this (re)negotiation in the accounts of NATO’s gendermen. Those with whom we spoke to articulated a great deal of respect for their colleagues. Witnessing the mutual admiration and respect the men and women of the Executive Committee of the NCGP had for each other whilst working together to advance gender issues within NATO was further testament to this. Yet, doing gender work and putting on your gender glasses (a point returned to in Chapter 5) also afforded an opportunity to increase mutual respect between men and women both inside and outside of NATO: In the armed forces as well as in civil society, it is not just a matter of having the same salaries, having the same access to work; it is having the same mentality. Once you get this mentality, especially in men, seeing life with your gender glasses, I think the lives of many people will change … you apply the gender glasses to everything and your level of respect for the other gender is much better. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) In addition to the fostering of respect, there was also a sense of empathy, both for women within NATO and those external to it, those affected by war and conflict that was articulated:96 NATO women and gendermen We try to find believers [in gender] and you find believers everywhere, they don’t need to be women, most of them are women. I can tell you, unfortunately, because I feel really alone in this world. I feel the same as when women joined the armed forces and they were just one or two and it is really hard, I can tell you, it is really hard. You have to behave because they are watching you … they are watching you, they are paying attention to what you do because you are, let’s say an alien in their world. You have to introduce this issue, but in a serious way. You have to explain to them basic gender concepts, very basic gender concepts, but you have to go deeper. It is not just: ‘What is gender mainstreaming?’, ‘What are gender perspectives?’ It is more. It applies to people suffering the effects of wars and operations. You have to listen to them, understand how they feel, how the operations affect them and in which ways; ask how you can help them. Interview with NATO Official, 2012 in Hurley (2018) As highlighted above, gendermen are in a distinct position within NATO, they find themselves in a minority position vis-à-vis women when working on gender. Doing this work makes men highly visible and this brings with it feelings of being out of place; this can prompt a form of empathy with women who occupy a minority position vis-à-vis men within NATO writ large (Hurley, 2018a).

### NATO Good – Gender Advisors

#### NATO’s WPS agenda proves state action can be good—Gender Advisors materially improve the lives of marginalized people globally

Wright 22

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK. “Challenging civil society perceptions of NATO: Engaging the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Cooperation and Conflict. April 2022. LJS

NATO’s own external presentation of the work of its Gender Advisors is largely extremely positive.52 The most comprehensive reviews of their work have been upbeat overall. Egnell, Hojem, and Berts’ presented Gender Advisors’ as having ‘made a gender perspective a real and permanent feature of Swedish contributions to international operations’53 We asked Gender Advisors what they felt had been their key successes. Their responses are scrutinized in two directions: first, internal: in terms of changing mindsets within their military structures as regards women and the relevance of gender (an aspect of regendering, discussed above) and changing their colleagues’ working practices; second, external: in terms of impacts upon communities – improving security for women and men, and increasing women’s participation. Changes in Military Practice and Mindsets Overwhelmingly, Gender Advisors tended to describe their success in terms of ‘institutionalization’ and ‘integration’ of procedures to include gender perspectives. The Gender Advisors generally conveyed a sense of slow but steady progress in acceptance of the relevance of gender to militaries, and processes to facilitate consideration of it in military operations. Lackenbauer and Langlais’ 2013 review had found that ISAF Gender Advisors had little structure for their work, having to decide on their own focus and tasks. The more recently deployed Gender Advisors we interviewed described established processes for Gender Advisors’ engagement in planning, identification of goals and indicators; more access to command; and fuller staffing of Gender Advisor posts. Those who been involved in the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, which commenced in January 2015, described gender as integrated in the Mission’s indicators and reporting mechanisms; operational plans and standard operating procedures; facilities, activities, budgets; and focusing not only upon women but upon influencing men. Some Gender Advisors describe a key mark of progress as the recognition by the command that integrating gender perspective is their responsibility, advised and supported by their Gender Advisor, rather than the responsibility of the Gender Advisor. When it started in 2008 … they put a lot of responsibility on the Gender Field Advisor. And then it was very easy to criticise the work because it’s very difficult to be successful if you’re, like, alone and … no one really knows what is this about … now the organisation has a full understanding and acceptance of this, and that is that the work of integrating a gender perspective should always be the Commander’s … So absolutely, absolutely it has evolved. (Agnes) Another ISAF Gender Advisor recounted being in a senior staff meeting in which the commander asked who was going to a conference organized by Afghan women. When eyes slid to the Gender Advisor, the commander said, ‘I am on board. We will push this button. And if I do it, you have to do it too’ (meaning they all had to go to the conference). Although describing gender as a ‘button’ raises questions, the Gender Advisor interpreted this as the commander reiterating the importance for all parts of the Mission of engaging with Afghan women. As evidence of institutionalization through the headquarters or operation, a number of Gender Advisors described colleagues independently including gender in planning documents or analyses. Many highlighted changing their colleagues’ mindset as regard the relevance of gender. Security and Women’s Empowerment A number of Gender Advisors gave examples of how their advice had been used to mitigate the harm that NATO’s own activities might pose to women. Some mentioned using a gender perspective in analysing intelligence so as to mitigate ‘collateral damage’ in NATO targeting. One described broadening consultation with local communities to include women, so to understand what roads they used, to be able to avoid them. One spoke of ‘prevent[ing] an American General killing some women’ by advising on how funding might be provided to community projects without inflaming local rivalries. Gender Advisors, however, most often described their successes as hoped-for impacts of their individual contacts with local women: having facilitated their coming together, inspiring them to join the security forces, motivating them. The first thing I wrote was a zero … [but] I met Afghan women and would see them six months later with burkhas off, talking to soldiers, trying to negotiate for funds … maybe a little drop that fills up the bucket, for me, that is enough. (Workshop participant) I hope that I have motivated one woman to not give up and keep fighting for women’s rights. (Workshop participant) A number of Gender Advisors had worked to support Afghan security forces in integrating women, and felt that their advocacy with the Afghan authorities to emphasize the importance of women’s participation had been successful. One talked about directly supporting female police through helping them to set up their own network; another about Gender Advisors’ support to centres and protection units dealing with gender based violence. Others talked about being role models for Afghan women to join the security forces. We noticed that, although the description of a Gender Advisor’s role in Bi-Strategic Directive 40-1 refers to gender analysis and collection of data, none identified progress by reference to measured changes in, for example, prevalence of acts of violence or community perceptions of security.54 They did not claim systematic positive impacts upon the lives of communities affected by conflict or by NATO operations; rather small wins and hopeful signals.

### NATO Good – A2 Imperialism

#### NATO’s engagement is not unidirectional imperialism, but a collaborative process with members and allies—UNSCR 1325 proves

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 53-54. LJS

UNSCR 1325 has proven a useful diplomatic tool for NATO’s EAPC partners to further their engagement and influence at NATO, incommensurate with status. The role of partner states in NATO’s adoption of UNSCR 1325 has challenged assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship. This challenges assumptions that NATO partnerships are (solely) outward-facing and that NATO sets the parameters of the relationship (Holmberg, 2011: 534; Webber, Hallams and Smith, 2014: 776; Simón, 2014: 18; Wallander, 2000: 729). For example, the NATO/EAPC Policy calls for NATO partners to be involved in the development of the Military Concept (what would become Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1), ‘to the maximum possible extent’ given ‘their important contributions of Partner nations to NATO-led operations’ (NATO, 2007). This has demonstrated that norm sharing can be a multi-directional process with NATO partners having had a significant role in putting UNSCR 1325 onto NATO’s agenda and in continuing to support it. This challenges understandings of NATO partnerships as unidirectional, both as a means through which NATO can influence the aspirations of non-members by setting the parameters of the relationship (Wallander, 2000: 729) and as a ‘functional tool for burden sharing’ (Hallams, 2013: 119). This is significant given the widening and broadening of NATO partnerships, including into Asia and the Middle East, necessitates a reassessment of the value of partnerships (for NATO and partners), even if NATO has yet to fully resolve the purpose of partnerships (Moore, 2012: 57). As this chapter goes onto discuss, the broadening of the actors involved within NATO’s engagement with WPS has strengthened both the latest iterations of the NATO/EAPC Policy on UNSCR 1325 applicable to the civilian structure and the accompanying military Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1. The actors involved include, but are not limited to, NATO Officials, member states, partner states, civil society, NATO Special Representative on WPS, IMS Office of the Gender Advisor, NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives and most recently Angelina Jolie. The alliance’s engagement with WPS has created new gender policy machinery in the form of the NATO Special Representative and the recreation of the IMS Office of the Gender Advisor and NCGP. It has also garnered attention from external actors who were not present and did not contribute to NATO’s initial engagement with WPS (civil society, Angelina Jolie). So, while the role of NATO partners, namely Austria and Sweden, and the Friends of 1325, was crucial in putting WPS onto NATO’s agenda, we need to consider if these new actors have influenced the ideas and practices underpinning WPS at NATO.

### Liberalism Good

#### The perm is best --- the alt fails alone but combining strategies provides meaningful routes for change

Paris, 10 – (Roland, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” February 17, 2010, <http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf>) // kt \*\*modified for ableist language

If there is no realistic or preferable alternative to broadly liberal approaches, what can be done in the face of the current “crisis” of liberal peacebuilding? The first step is to question the extent to which this crisis is real or imagined. In this article, I have attempted to show that some of the most sweeping critiques of liberal peacebuilding have rested on dubious claims and logic, including the conflation of post-conquest and post-settlement peacebuilding; unnuanced analogies of peacebuilding and colonialism or imperialism; definitions of the liberal peace that are too broad; mischaracterizations of the peacebuilding record; and oversimplifications of the moral complexity of peacebuilding. Considered in this light, the purported crisis of liberal peacebuilding appears to be less severe and less fundamental than some have claimed. The challenge today is not to replace or move “beyond” liberal peacebuilding, but to reform existing approaches within a broadly liberal framework. This enterprise has both conceptual and policy elements. Peacebuilding remains ripe for theoretical treatments that shed light on the meaning and effects of these operations. In other words, the peacebuilding literature need not, and should not, be limited to narrowly policy-oriented or “problem solving” analyses. In the 1990s, most of the peacebuilding literature was preoccupied with practical policy issues and paid little attention to the relationships between peacebuilding and larger phenomena in international politics. The rise of more critical analysis since then has been part of a welcome broadening of the field, which now places greater emphasis on exploring the theoretical underpinnings and implications of these missions. The great strength of critical approaches has always been their focus on exposing and dissecting widely held assumptions and orthodoxies. But critical scholarship can lose its intellectual and empirical moorings if it fails to be self-reflective and self-critical – that is, if its logic, evidence and implications are not themselves subject to scrutiny and challenge. Nothing in the recent critical literature offers a convincing rationale for abandoning liberal peacebuilding, rather than reforming it. If anything, the rise of what I have called hyper-critical scholarship – and particularly its dubious yet seemingly ritualized rejection of liberal peacebuilding – has served to cloud rather than clarify our understanding of what peacebuilding is, and what it does. 38 Of course, there is no single “best” way of analyzing these missions or the broader phenomenon of international peacebuilding. This field of research is – and hopefully will remain – a diverse bazaar of different theoretical and empirical approaches, open to discussion and debate across intellectual traditions and methodologies. This article has sought to contribute to this debate by arguing for a rethinking and rebalancing of liberal peacebuilding critiques. In contrast to the unconvincing hyper-criticism of today, or the irrational exuberance of earlier years, a more constructively critical approach might build on the recognition that: (1) both liberalism and liberal peacebuilding are deeply problematic concepts – in theory and application – and their internal contradictions play themselves out in peacebuilding, sometimes in troubling and destructive ways; (2) liberally-oriented peacebuilding can, in principle, accommodate a great deal of internal variation and adjustment, including many of the specific changes proposed by many critics; (3) scholars who repudiate liberal peacebuilding or call for “alternative” strategies should be expected to reflect carefully on the normative underpinnings of their own arguments, and to clarify the alternatives they may be proposing, including the moral and practical implications of pursuing these alternatives. The third point should be particularly important for those who believe that critical peacebuilding scholarship has an important contribution to make to the field – and that the recent turn towards a reflexive anti-liberalism has diminished the force of these critiques. Adopting a constructively critical orientation does not mean accepting the current practices of peacebuilding. It does not mean that peacebuilding must be “top-down” instead of “bottom-up” – that is a criticism of centralism, not liberalism. It does not mean that peacebuilding should be fixated on formal institutions to the exclusion of informal or customary methods of governance – that is a criticism of formalism, not liberalism. It does not mean that peacebuilders should adopt a “fixed, non-negotiable concept of what the state should eventually look like”117 – that is a criticism of institutional isomorphism, not liberalism. Nor does it mean that peacebuilders should assume that liberalization will necessarily foster peace – that is a criticism of naïve Wilsonianism, one variant of liberalism.118 Addressing all of these real problems may entail probing the internal tensions of liberalism, but it does not require a sweeping rejection of liberal peacebuilding. In fact, there are many recent examples of constructively critical research that raise important theoretical and practical questions, some of which challenge liberal premises without making the mistake of discarding the baby with the bathwater. For instance: What are the sources and dynamics of “legitimacy” in international peacebuilding?119 What obligations, if any, do international actors have in rebuilding societies after conflict?120 What are the limits of external democracy promotion efforts?121 How might “non-elite” populations of host states be included more directly into peace negotiations and post-conflict institutional reform?122 What is the relationship between power-sharing arrangements and peace?123 How might ideas of “local ownership” be developed in a manner that avoids simplistic bromides about the need for greater local ownership or emancipation?124 Other examples include: How do “discursive frames” and organizational procedures shape the design and conduct of peacebuilding in practice?125 How can peacebuilding agencies learn from experiences across missions without falling into the trap of assuming that “technical” knowledge is readily transferrable across diverse local circumstances?126 Why does the UN seem to make peacebuilding commitments that it subsequently fails to fulfill in practice?127 What are the economic impacts of peacebuilding operations?128 What is the relationship between “peace conditionalities” in economic assistance and the durability of the ensuing peace?129 How can economic liberalization be pursued in ways that minimize the dangers of strengthening black markets?130 Under what circumstances should peacebuilding missions end, and how should they “exit”?131 This is just a small sampling of research questions that represent a broad mix of normative approaches. They point to even larger unresolved questions, including the crucial issue of how one should define peacebuilding “success.”132 Many of these research efforts also offer the possibility of making peacebuilding operations more effective, and more just, in the future. Whichever research paths one may chose to follow, those engaged in constructively critical analysis have an immense task ahead of them: peacebuilding is tremendously complex and prone to unanticipated consequences, yet it is also too important to lose or abandon. As long as both scholars and practitioners embrace an open, critical discussion of peacebuilding’s merits and flaws, without descending into unwarranted hyper-criticism, there is still hope of improving both the conception and delivery of international assistance to societies embarking on difficult transitions from war to peace.

#### Liberalism is inevitable and a transition would cause escalating conflict – the alt excludes the aff but the aff doesn’t exclude the alt

Paris, 10 – (Roland, Associate Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, “Saving Liberal Peacebuilding,” February 17, 2010, <http://aix1.uottawa.ca/~rparis/Saving_Liberal_Peacebuilding_FINAL.pdf>) // kt \*\*modified for ableist language

In fact, there seems to be no viable alternative to some version of liberal peacebuilding. Consider, first, the question of whether international peacebuilding should be continued at all. As we saw, some commentators including Jeffrey Herbst and Jeremy Weinstein have suggested that conflicts should sometimes be allowed to burn themselves out, and that large-scale “impartial” intervention (even after a ceasefire agreement) risks locking in conditions that are not sustainable or compatible with long-term peace. There is some logic to this approach, since wars ending in military victory may produce longer-lasting peace than those ending in negotiated settlements. But this strategy could also involve huge risks and costs: The victors might decimate the losers, or alternatively some wars might grind on for years or decades without resolution, all the while producing humanitarian crises before one side finally achieves victory. In the meantime, conflicts could spread to neighbouring territories, as several have done in Africa in recent years. On balance, then, failing to provide assistance when it is possible to do so, and when it is requested by local parties, would seem a short-sighted and dangerous solution to the shortcomings of these operations; just as suspending the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding would be a significant overreaction to the various problems that these missions have experienced and caused. Nor is there any sign of declining demand for new operations, given the increased trend for civil conflicts to end in negotiated settlements in recent years.97 But why, in this case, must peacebuilding be liberal? The simple answer is that alternative strategies – that is, strategies not rooted in liberal principles – would likely create more problems than they would solve. One approach, for example, might be for international agencies to establish permanent trusteeships over war-torn states – that is, externally run governments that have no intention of ceding their authority to local actors. This option is not unlike the formula proposed by Stephen Krasner, who called for direct international governance of dangerously fragile states “for an indefinite period of time.”98 The main problem with this approach is that it would come very close to colonial-type control – indeed, much more so than even the most longlasting and interventionist post-settlement missions that have been conducted to date. Maintaining such an arrangement over the long term would likely require permanent suppression of domestic political activity within the host state. As David Edelstein points out, even when foreign military deployments are made at the invitation of local parties, they face a problem of an “obsolescing welcome” whereby elements of the local population tend to grow increasingly resentful of a powerful external presence in their society.99 Continuing to embrace the objective of transferring full sovereign powers to local actors may thus be the single most important strategy for addressing this problem and for widening the “window” of time available for peacebuilders to assist in strengthening domestic institutions within the host state. By contrast, establishing permanent foreign rule would reduce the time available for peacebuilders to do their work before local resentment begins to build and the peacebuilding mission becomes an obstacle to, rather than a facilitator of, consolidating a stable peace. A second alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be for international agencies to identify local leaders who could rule as undemocratic strongmen over their society. This would, at least, provide a means for peacebuilders to scale back their presence quickly, as long as they continued to offer various types of support (financial, material, etc.) to the ruling person or party. Indeed, this was roughly that strategy that the United States and Soviet Union pursued with their respective patrons in many parts of the world during the Cold War. However, one of the practical problems with this approach is that authoritarian regimes created and sustained by external parties have often turned out to be more fragile than they appear, in part because they tend to lack domestic legitimacy and therefore remain in power only by repressing or buying off their internal rivals. This was one of the lessons learned at the end of the Cold War, when a reduction or cessation of immense flows of superpower assistance led to the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Somalia, Zaire/Congo and elsewhere, followed by a violent scramble for power. Furthermore, in a country just emerging from civil war, where two or more factions were engaged in large-scale killing, a postconflict “strongman strategy” would risk alienating unrepresented groups that might choose to resume violence rather than living under the new regime. Some measure of power-sharing, or at least a reasonable prospect of gaining power through an unrigged political process, generally helps to mitigate this danger.100 A third alternative to liberal peacebuilding might be to rely on traditional or indigenous practices of peace-making and governance, rather than elections and other accoutrements of liberal democracy. Roger Mac Guinty has usefully highlighted the limited space provided for such approaches in existing peacebuilding models, which tend to be “highly standardized” and rooted in a sense of the “superiority of Western approaches to peace-making.”101 In contrast to the more formalistic and legalistic approaches, traditional and indigenous methods tend to focus on “consensus decision-making, a restoration of the human/resource balance, and compensation or gift exchange designed to ensure reciprocal and ongoing harmonious relations between groups.”102 Because they reflect local customs, he adds, these techniques may “hold the potential to achieve a grass-roots legitimacy that may be lacking from more technocratic ‘alien’ forms of dispute resolution that form the mainstay of Western-funded and designed peacesupport programs and projects.”103 While Mac Guinty makes a strong case for adapting policies to local conditions and traditions (using examples such as Afghanistan’s Loya Jirgas, or tribal assemblies, which played an important role in that country’s initial transition from Taliban rule), he does not recommend relying exclusively on such techniques. On the contrary, he wisely warns of the danger of romanticizing traditional or indigenous practices – not least because they may serve to reinforce “the authority of existing power-holders” and to impose “social conformity,” sometimes in brutal ways.104 Tanja Chopra’s analysis of local peacebuilding initiatives in Kenya offers cautionary tale illustrating these dangers. Efforts to tap into traditional conflict-resolution techniques through community-level “peace committees” in Keyna have shown some success, but in some cases they have also served to “deepen existing rifts between communities” and “reinforce divisions” while also undermining concurrent efforts to strengthen respect for the rule of law at the national level.105 Traditional and bottom-up approaches, in other words, should be part of peacebuilding, but they are no panacea. There are other reasons to be cautious before embracing traditional governance methods. Those who believe that doing so will eliminate or reduce the intrusion of foreign peacebuilders in the domestic affairs of the host state fail to recognize that peacebuilders will still need to make crucial choices, whether they wish to do so or not. No society has a single, unambiguous set of governance structures (traditional or otherwise) that can be automatically activated. Consequential decisions must therefore be made to privilege some structures and not others – and, as much as peacebuilders might view themselves as referees in such decisions, in fact they will always be “players” simply by virtue of their relative power in the domestic setting of a wartorn state.106 In any event, some measure of external influence may be necessary and desirable: if the post-conflict society could organize its own governance arrangements without international assistance, there would have been no need or demand for peacebuilding in the first place. Given all this, consider the implications if international agencies were to adopt a general policy of relying on indigenous governance structures in post-conflict countries. Very likely, any political outcomes of this process would be questioned and contested due to perceived international “interference,” no matter how well-meaning and diligent the peacebuilders were in seeking to remain neutral. Further, in cases where one individual or group dominated such a process, the result could be the equivalent of the second alternative to liberal peacebuilding discussed above – strongman rule – with all the problems associated with that option. These are all real concerns that counsel caution, but in spite of the risks and complexities, experience in Afghanistan, Cambodia and elsewhere suggests that much more research attention needs to be devoted to the topic of hybrid arrangements in countries recovering from conflict, or approaches those that blend formal, informal, modern and customary methods of governance and conflict resolution.107 It is also interesting that Mac Guinty argues that one of the benefits of customary arrangements could be to enhance “political participation,” while he also warns against the dangers of authoritarianism. Such arguments suggest that Mac Guinty, like other commentators discussed above, is less concerned with the liberal orientation of current peacebuilding approaches than he is with their relative rigidity and lack of adaptability to local conditions. In fact, there is nothing in the idea of the “liberal peace” or “liberal peacebuilding” that mandates such inflexibility. Liberal polities come in many different styles and forms, from group-based “consociational” proportional representation arrangements to Anglo-American-style plurality systems, and there is nothing to prevent liberalism from accommodating new models. Nor does support for liberal political principles stand in the way of pursuing any number of complementary initiatives and goals, including those focusing on post-conflict reconciliation,108 social welfare and justice,109 extensive public deliberations at the national and local levels,110 or the empowerment and inclusion of women and other marginalized groups.111 The key principles of liberalism – individual freedoms, representative government, and constitutional limits on arbitrary power – offer a broader canvas for institutional design and creative policymaking. Without clear alternatives, some version of liberalism therefore remains the most sensible foundation for post-conflict peacebuilding. The overarching goal of such missions should be to create the conditions for representative self-government, not only because such an outcome is the least morally objectionable goal for peacebuilding, but also for the practical purpose of facilitating the eventual departure of peacebuilders through the restoration of domestic sovereignty over the territory. Further, while the importance of elections alone should not be exaggerated, they remain a crucial tool for populations to constitute their own governments, not only during the period of peacebuilding, but on an ongoing basis.112 While it is true that encouraging elections itself involves an external intrusion in the internal affairs of the host state, surely we can differentiate between more and less acceptable intrusions – including the fact that elections are meant to facilitate the society’s ability to shape its own destiny and exercise self-government, so that the peacebuilders themselves can leave. Elections alone cannot achieve this goal, nor do elections equal democracy. But of all the possible ways in which international actors can influence the domestic politics of a country, the idea of promoting self-government is one of the least morally objectionable – and, from the standpoint of not overstaying an “obsolescing welcome,” it may be a pragmatic necessity. Similarly, while certain economic liberalization strategies can be destabilizing,113 is there really an alternative to some version of market-oriented reform in states emerging from war? The second half of the twentieth century demonstrated that centrally planned and state-dominated development strategies – including not only Soviet-style communism but also import substitution strategies pursued in many parts of Latin America and Africa – generally produced lower levels of economic growth than market-oriented development strategies. Debates continue about the appropriate balance between the market and the state in economic development, including greater regulation of financial institutions and the like, but there is near-universal agreement today that non-market-oriented economic policies (or those that do not give the market a primary role in allocating scarce resources) are too inefficient to generate sustained economic growth. Most of those who have criticized the economic dimensions of liberal peacebuilding (including this author) have called for less aggressive adjustment strategies in order to reduce the destabilizing effects of rapid marketization, but have not rejected the idea of economic liberalization itself – in part because economic growth is important to the long-term success of peacebuilding.114 Although there is no guarantee that states pursuing market-oriented development policies will become richer, there is a near guarantee that those pursuing nonmarket-oriented strategies will stay poor. There is no universally-applicable, market-oriented model appropriate for all peacebuilding cases. Rather, there are countless variations of liberal economic policies that can be explored and pursued,115 but all share one thing in common: a primary orientation toward markets as a foundation for long-term growth. If existing economic policies have been ill-suited to the needs of war-torn states, it is not because these policies have been “liberal” or market-oriented in the broad sense of these terms, but rather, because they have paid too little attention to the particular vulnerabilities of countries just emerging from destructive and divisive conflicts, including the potentially destabilizing effects of “shock therapy” adjustment policies.116 Addressing such problems primarily involves altering and customizing, not abandoning, the economically liberal elements of peacebuilding.

### Policy Good

#### Policy reforms have created meaningful changes to NATO’s gender initiatives

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 55-58. LJS

Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40–1 (Bi-SCD 40–1) represents NATO’s military structure’s engagement with WPS. Here we consider Bi-SCD 40–1 as an integral part of NATO’s gender architecture and a key moment in NATO’s initial engagement with UNSCR 1325 and later WPS. It was adopted in 2009 and has since been revised twice, in 2012 and most recently in 20175 (NATO, 2009, 2012a). The latest version represents a significant development in the sophistication of NATO’s understanding of WPS and gender perspectives, it also outlines a clear line of accountability. In a move away from previous versions, the Commander is clearly identified as the responsible person for its implementation, with gender advisors providing support and advice and gender focal points acting as a facilitators (NATO, 2017b). As Chapter 5 will go onto argue, examining these policies demonstrates both the changes in NATO’s understanding of the value of a gender perspective, but also the continuities. Here, we provide an important context for this discussion and consider the institutional actors responsible for shaping it. Following the call in the 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy for NATO’s Military Authorities to lead on its implementation, Bi-SCD 40–1 was adopted in 2009. As we go on to highlight in Chapter 5, the NATO Strategic Commands – Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) – jointly drafted Bi-Strategic Command 40–1 ‘Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure’, with the aim of providing ‘guidance for the integration of Resolutions, Conventions, Protocols and gender perspective into the planning and conduct of NATO-led operations’ (Colao, 2013: 19). The document is binding on all International Military Headquarters and any entity under the ACO or ACT chain of command, which includes partner states. This represents another way in which NATO acts as a ‘teaching machine’ (Enloe, 1981; Wright, 2016), with both member and partner states deployed on NATO operations learning the value Bi-Strategic Command 40–1 ascribes to the WPS agenda. Bi-SCD 40–1 is not military doctrine (doctrines are approved by the nations in the Military Committee), but rather the core document for implementing a gender perspective in NATO military operations. Bi-SCD 40–1 integrates UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions as well as a gender perspective in the NATO Command Structure, including measures for protection during armed conflict. It is founded upon the three UNSCR 1325 ‘P’s’: prevent disproportionate impact on women and children in armed conflict; protect women and children; and foster the participation of women in all aspects of operations and levels of command. The directive introduces standards of behaviour and concepts inherent in EU and UN policy (e.g. gender advisors, incorporating gender perspectives in operational planning development). The integration of gender into Allied Joint Doctrine is now the responsibility of the Gender Advisors at ACO and ACT (NATO ACT, 2015). Bi-SCD 40–1 contributes to standardising operations and establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks between different military actors under the Allied Joint Doctrine version 1 in respect to gender perspectives and WPS (NATO, 2017a). We return to Bi-SCD in Chapter 5 where we consider what a ‘gender perspective’ means for NATO. Institutional actors: supporting WPS at NATO In 2009, the Committee on Women in NATO Forces was renamed the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives (NCGP) and its remit expanded to provide advice on gender issues, including the implementation of UNSCRs 1325 and 1820 and future related UNSCRs under the remit of WPS. We discuss the role of the NCGP in further detail in the following chapters, including its important role in supporting NATO’s engagement with WPS. Here, our focus turns to the other institutional actors who have supported UNSCR 1325 at NATO, particularly in NATO’s political structure. This provides important context for understanding how the NCGP has supported WPS and how NATO’s engagement with gender issues transgresses across the military and political structures. In 2013, UN Women commissioned a Global Review of 1325 to mark the 15th anniversary of since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2015. In the subsequent report, NATO’s Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS was identified as an example of good practice for the implementation of the agenda because the position was high profile and reports directly to the Secretary General (Coomaraswamy, 2015). The Special Representative has since been invited to address the UN Security Council, and regularly meets with counterparts in the EU, OSCE and AU and works with civil society on the issues. The position has been held by two career diplomats Mari Skåre (2012–14) and Marriët Schuurman (2014–17) and in 2018, Clare Hutchinson, a highly experienced and accomplished gender advisor, took over the role. The creation of the role has provided an important cornerstone of NATO’s engagement with WPS, yet it was not a foregone conclusion that it would be created and considering how NATO came to have such a position is important for understanding how NATO functions as a gendered institution. The creation of the post of NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for WPS was approved at NATO’s 2012 Chicago Summit (WIIS, 2012) and marked a watershed moment in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 at NATO. The move to appoint an individual to support NATO’s implementation of UNSCR 1325 stemmed from the 2007 NATO/EAPC Policy, which called for consideration to be given to the appointment of a gender advisor at NATO HQ (NATO, 2007). However, a Special Representative was a far more senior role, whose position has the potential to support the advancement of the WPS agenda at NATO. In considering the significance of the appointment of a Special Representative on WPS it is important to distinguish such a role from that of a gender advisor. A gender advisor acts as a means through which to incorporate a gender perspective and in this sense can come to represent an institution’s gender expertise. In operational situations and organisational departments, a gender advisor can provide a useful means for incorporating a gender perspective, in particular where specialised knowledge is required. Nevertheless, at a wider organisational level, a gender advisor would symbolise an institution’s gender expertise and this would be likely to hinder attempts to mainstream a gender perspective throughout the organisational structure, particularly where they lack the seniority to report directly to the top of the organisational command. For example, the appointment of a gender advisor within the EU External Action Service has been criticised because the position does not report directly to the High-Representative and as such lacks sufficient authority (Guerrina and Wright, 2016). A high-level Special Representative on the other hand provides institutional leadership and is able to hold the organisation account for the implementation of WPS. This is why NATO’s creation of the post of Secretary General’s Special Representative on WPS has been recognised as an example of best practice for regional organisations. The Global Review of UNSCR 1325 recommended that regional organisations follow NATO’s best practice and appoint high-level WPS representatives in order to drive the implementation of the agenda (Coomaraswamy, 2015: 409).

### Women Participation Good

#### Women are participating in political processes around the world – that engagement is critical to combat instability

UN Women, 17 – (UN Women, September 14, 2017, "Editorial spotlight: International Day of Democracy 2017," <http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/9/compilation-democracy-day>) // kt

Democracy, sustainable peace and conflict prevention cannot be achieved if women—half of the population—are left behind. This year's International Day of Democracy (15 September) theme, “Democracy and Conflict Prevention”, calls for “strong leadership to support democracy, strengthen civil society, empower women and uphold the rule of law”. [infographic omitted] See infographic on women in leadership » Democracy goes hand in hand with women’s rights Despite women’s leadership and their right to participate in democracy, there is still a wide-underrepresentation of women in politics and decision-making around the world, with women accounting for only 23.4 per cent of parliamentarians around the world and less than one-third of women holding senior and middle-management positions. Laws affecting women’s rights and women’s bodies are being made in Parliaments dominated by men. Women should have an active voice in policies that affect them, and their leadership is indispensable for preventing conflicts and building resilient societies. UN Women is working with countries to end discriminatory laws, policies and attitudes that are holding women and girls back. Women leading political progress Despite slow progress, across the world women are working hard to change the political landscape. In the African continent this year, hundreds of women are running for office. Coumba Diaw grew up hearing women couldn’t run for elections. Today, she is the only women Mayor in the Louga region of Senegal. Read more » “I understand the issues in my electoral district— we don’t have many teachers; the roads are damaged and our healthcare system is poor. I know how to convince my constituents that working together, we can derive better solutions when I am elected to represent them.” In October 2017, Liberians will head to the polls to vote, as President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa’s first elected female Head of State, completes her second and final term tenure this year. Thirty-seven-year Christine Juah Settor Dennis is running for a parliamentary seat. Read more » “I am going door to door, campaigning to urge women and youth to vote for me. Our time is now or never.” In Kenya, women ran for county elections, and UN Women and partners worked to change the attitudes of the traditional leaders. When Abdia Gole, 33, first announced her decision to run for political office, people in her community ridiculed her. The Council of Elders, who are the traditional leaders of the community and have the ultimate say in such matters, also disapproved Gole’s intentions. Read more » The new Tunisian Constitution for the first time includes a clause guaranteeing women’s rights, an unprecedented milestone for gender equality. Among the people who brought this Constitution to life was women’s rights activist Mehrezia Maïza Labidi. “I chaired a majority of the plenary sessions on Tunisia’s new constitution. It was my first time in politics, and I ended up writing a constitution!” “Women in politics are still women,” says Ms. Labidi . “We can laugh and be joyful and still be in politics. We do not want to be like men, we want to be ourselves and still engage effectively in politics.” Read more » In Europe and Central Asia, women have been scaling-up their political participation from the local to the national level. “I hope that [women] will be part of decision-making, fight for more policies for women’s economic and social empowerment, and not remain mere numbers in the new Parliament!” In the recently concluded national elections, Albania reached a new milestone with 28 per cent of women parliamentarians. Albanian Member of Parliament Albana Vokshi has been elected for the third consecutive time, and is a strong advocate for women shaping policies and decisions. Read more» Nuriya Temirbek kyzy, a 40-year-old mother of three from Naryn, in central Kyrgyzstan, used to be a housewife. Although she worked all day, taking care of her family, she had less decision-making power since she didn’t earn an income. Today, she has been elected as a member of the Ak-jara village local council, where she actively advocates for women’s rights. Read more » In Asia and the Pacific, women are breaking gender stereotypes and making democracies stronger. Barbara Garma Soares, from Suku Sau, is one of 21 women elected Xefe Suku (Village Chief) in local elections in Timor-Leste. Photo credit: UN Women/Corinne Roberts “It’s vital to shift community opinion, to show people that women are not just wives and mothers, but capable leaders at all levels.” In Timor-Leste, despite never having a woman lead their community as Village Chief before, the villagers of Suku Sau were won over by Barbara Garma Soares. Read more » A woman in Nepal speaks up at an event contesting local polls. Photo: UN Women “I am contesting the upcoming election with my headscarf on, duly following the advice of my mother-in-law. But I have offered my full support to my daughter-in-law to contest the polls without the scarf” In Nepal, women contested for leadership roles to put an end to socio-economic and cultural discrimination against women. Read more » In Latin America, women’s leadership and political participation is combating machismo and building peace. Lucía del Socorro Basante “I was scared to become a candidate, despite all my years of experience as a lawyer. The fear that male councillors will raise their voices, the fear of not being capable, of being in men’s territory. More is demanded of us [as women]” Colombia has made headlines in the last year for the implementation of the peace agreement with the FARC, slowly putting an end to more than half a century of conflict and instability. But achieving gender equality is central to sustainable peace. Lucía del Socorro’s story tells us how she overcame the societal barriers impairing women running for office.

### Reforms Good

#### Legal reforms challenge essentialist notions of gender

Williams, 13 (Dr. Juliet A., associate professor in the Department of Gender Studies at UCLA, "Girls can be anything...but boys will be boys: discourses of sex difference in education reform debates," Nevada Law Journal, Vol. 13, 5-17-13, scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1472&context=nlj)

\*In this context the “gender essentialists” that Williams is talking about are those who think that masculine behavior is innately tied to their biological sex. Meaning that she is arguing we need to challenge notions that boys are and will always be aggressive, etc. She is also talking about sex stereotyping in the context of promoting single gender education environments\*

Law has an important role to play in opening up space to contest gender essentialism. One way this may happen is through rigorous application of the still-evolving anti-stereotyping principle in constitutional equal protection analysis. The determination of whether a classification constitutes stereotyping generally has been understood to pivot on the question of whether an overbroad generalization is at play. As a result, the judicial account of sex difference has been characterized as a form of “sexual realism.”67 As Katherine Franke argues, in constitutional jurisprudence, “the wrong of sex discrimination is premised upon a right of sexual differentiation, that is, a fundamental belief in the truth of biological sexual difference.”68 From this perspective, “[d]iscrimination occurs when false or stereotypical differences are mistaken for real differences.”69 More recently, however, legal scholar Cary Franklin has demonstrated that the anti-stereotyping principle is being applied even in cases in which a biological sex difference is recognized. 70 Reflecting on the significance of the 1996 decision U.S. v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court found the male-only admission policy at a state-supported military college unconstitutional, Franklin finds growing judicial support for the view that “equal protection law should be particularly alert to the possibility of sex stereotyping in contexts where ‘real’ differences are involved, because these are the contexts in which sex classifications have most often been used to perpetuate sex-based inequality.”71 In other words, the anti-stereotyping principle is now invoked to engage the question of the social meaning attributed to sex differences by a classification. In so doing, anti-stereotyping analysis thrusts the social construction of masculinity to the fore, a development that creates critical leverage for future challenges to essentialist pedagogies in court. The evidence rallied to support sex segregation must be carefully reviewed to ensure that sex stereotyping does not take the place of meaningful education reforms.72 Responding to legal challenges, proponents of “gender-friendly” educational initiatives portray their detractors as feminist ideologues unwilling to accept the simple facts of nature. But rhetorical warfare is no substitute for a fair and impartial review of existing evidence. Indeed, an important legacy of feminist legal reforms of the past several decades has been a progressive strengthening of the anti-stereotyping principle in sex-discrimination law.73 The vigorous application of a robust anti-stereotyping principle in law has played a critical role in defeating essentialist justifications for policies that promote the subordination of girls and women.74 But in the case of boys and men, essentialist discourses are proving more resilient. No doubt law once again has a central role to play in challenging essentialist policies that insist we accommodate rather than interrogate the basis for masculine behavior. VI. GIRLS CAN BE ANYTHING . . . BUT BOYS WILL BE BOYS After two decades of concerted gender advocacy in the United States, girls’ advocates and boys’ advocates are sharply divided when it comes to questions of gender difference. Building on legal reforms of the 1970s that were designed to curtail sex discrimination and gender bias in the classroom, advocates for girls traditionally have emphasized the need to challenge social attitudes and practices that stand in the way of girls’ success. Where at one time the dominant social view of girls emphasized inherent limitations, there is now a flourishing discourse of possibility and “the sky’s the limit” thinking about girls.75 The same cannot be said in the case of gender advocacy for boys, where essentialist claims have risen to the forefront. Indeed, among boys’ advocates, there is a growing demand to adjust educational environments and expectations to accommodate boys’ innate capacities and interests. What emerges, then, is a divergent discourse about kids, one which simultaneously proclaims that girls can do anything but boys will be boys.76 In this way, contemporary gender discourse in education suggests a striking shift in what anthropologist Sherry Ortner has called the “underlying logic of cultural thinking” about sex and gender.77 In a now classic essay, Is Female to Male as Nature is to Culture?, Ortner declared “the secondary status of woman” to be “one of the true universals” of human societies.78 Ortner attributes this “stubborn” fact to the universal association of woman with nature and man with culture, an attribution derived from “woman’s greater bodily involvement” with reproduction.79 But the message emerging from boys’ advocates today suggests a significant reversal in the familiar terms of gender discourse. In contemporary education reform debates, it is in discussions of girls that we most often encounter a transcendent rhetoric of possibility. In contrast, we are much more likely to be warned of the damaging effects of pushing boys beyond biologically-determined cognitive and emotional limits. One should not presume, however, that this shift indicates a reversal in the gender hierarchy, for the appropriation of an essentialist discourse by boys’ advocates may in fact serve to reinforce male privilege. Today, appeals to nature function as an implicit rejoinder to the suggestion that boys’ troubles emanate in practices of gender socialization that reward aggression and discourage the expression of emotional vulnerability in boys and men. Indeed, in the education-reform debates, the assertion of boys’ fixed and immutable nature has emerged as a powerful tool to subvert interrogation of masculinity. From this perspective, among the most important items of unfinished business for feminism today is a more serious reckoning with the effects of essentialized masculinity.80

### A2 No Policy W/O Activism

#### NATO’s adoption of WPS was independent of activists—top-down politics solve

Wright, Hurley, & Gil Ruiz 19

Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “The long view Situating NATO’s engagement with women, peace and security.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 49-50. LJS

The eight WPS resolutions, which make-up the WPS agenda, each have their own strengths and weaknesses, but it is clear that the greater engagement there was with the NGO Working Group, the better the outcomes in terms of aligning with feminist goals. The continued feminist engagement with the resolutions is evidenced in the strengthening of the feminist content in the WPS resolutions. The adoption of the WPS resolutions has had a number of positive effects, including challenging the Security Council’s conservative approach to gender (Otto, 2010: 98). The WPS agenda embodied in the resolutions has created a ‘snowball effect’ on institutional activity backed by the power of the Security Council (Otto, 2010: 103). Many parts of the UN structure have become involved in the implementation of the WPS agenda, for example, the InterAgency Network on Women and Gender Equality (IANWGE) established a task force on WPS to coordinate the mainstreaming of WPS into the UN bureaucracy (Otto, 2010: 103). The WPS agenda has utility for a range of actors and settings beyond that envisaged by those who supported the passage of UNSCR 1325 through the Security Council. For example, McLeod’s (2012: 137) research on Women in Black in Serbia finds that after learning about UNSCR 1325, the group conceived ways in which the Resolution could be used strategically to support their existing goals. Prior to their engagement with the WPS agenda in 2005, Women in Black did not articulate ‘security’ as one of their core values. The use of ‘mainstream’ language on security to express feminist goals therefore became a strategy to achieve their pre-existing objectives. In understanding WPS as a ‘travelling concept’ we see how it has moved from transnational feminism to formal acceptance by the UN Security Council, to national and local engagement by grassroots civil society actors. NATO’s adoption of the WPS agenda adds an additional dimension to this journey. NATO did not engage with the WPS as a response to pressure from feminist civil society nor did it formally consult civil society until the 2014 iteration of the NATO/EAPC Policy. Despite the initial NATO/EAPC Policy on WPS adopted in 2007 calling for civil society consultation, this did not occur formally until seven years later. Rather, NATO’s initial engagement was the result of state-level advocacy of the issue which framed WPS as part of NATO’s existing concern with the status of women in the military, as a tool to increase operational effectiveness and also to engage partner states. This journey served to remove WPS from a direct link to feminist advocacy. This leaves open the possibility that NATO’s interpretation of UNSCR 1325 has shaped the WPS agenda itself. This is something we consider further in Chapter 5 where we discuss how the concept of a ‘gender perspective’, initially articulated in UNSCR 1325, has travelled to and been embraced by NATO.

## Perms

### Perm Do Both – WPS

#### Perm do both—NATO’s Women Peace, Security agenda proves traditional policy analysis and feminist analysis are not mutually exclusive—WPS can be expanded into cybersecurity

Mhajne, K.C, and Whetstone 21

Anwar, Assistant Professor of Political Science and the Head Faculty Fellow for the Center for the Study of Race, Ethnicity, and Social Justice at Stonehill College; Luna, Postdoctoral Researcher on Women Peace and Security (WPS) - Research Network, Center for International Peace and Security Studies, McGill University; Crystal, Assistant Professor at Sam Houston State University's Political Science Department. “A call for feminist analysis in cybersecurity: highlighting the relevance of the Women, Peace and Security agenda.” Centre for Women, Peace, and Security. 9/17/2021. LJS

So far, cybersecurity, defined as “the preservation – through policy, technology, and education – of the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of information and its underlying infrastructure to enhance the security of persons both online and offline,” has been a key focus for policymakers and defense institutions. Weaponising a civilian space has enormous implications for human rights, especially for women who are already disadvantaged in conflict settings. While national security matters, we suggest that cybersecurity needs to take human rights seriously by centering people’s empowerment and well-being. We see a need to extend the WPS agenda, including 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs), to the cyber realm to achieve sustainable peace. The WPS agenda promotes human security by encouraging the participation of women in peace and security governance. We envision 1325 as protecting women, girls, trans, queer, and other sexual and gender minorities from online GBV and ensuring equal access to cybersecurity both in terms of access to cyber technologies and participating in cybersecurity governance. The WPS agenda could be used in cyberspace to: • Ensure women from diverse backgrounds are in decision-making positions in cybersecurity governance and expanding the number of women in cybersecurity across the board, as well as women’s equal access to cyber technologies. As Brown and Pytlak explain, participation in cyber is critical to representation. Without women’s full and equal participation, their perspectives are unlikely to be represented within cyber policy or their perspective taken seriously in cyber policy.• Provide for the application of a feminist intersectional approach regarding cyberspace to understand how women, girls, and diverse gendered categories experience cyberspace differently. Cyberspace is not equal, and a one-size-fits-all policy does not work for everyone, particularly, women and girls in conflict-affected contexts, who might face unique challenges while using the cyber realm due to weak cyber laws. • Launch gender-disaggregated data collection on cyber-space tools and resources countries and businesses in the private sector (Facebook, Twitter, Tok-tok) are creating and utilising to make cyberspace safer by protecting the data privacy and security of marginalised groups, including women and girls as well as trans, queer, nonbinary and other sexual and gender minorities face in cybersphere. • Promote training for cybersecurity professionals, scholars and policymakers on gender-specific issues in cybersecurity and recognise that achieving sustainable peace requires achieving a safe cyberspace. We build on recent work by Feminist IR scholars who have made a case for using 1325 and the WPS agenda beyond conflict settings. For instance, Laura Shepherd argues that since no country is violence-free or full of gender equality, there is a need to apply 1325 beyond war and postwar contexts. Similarly, in this piece, we try to expand the scope of application for the WPS agenda to include cyberspace in all contexts, with a focus on conflict-affected countries. To do so, more feminist analysis is needed to help us understand how complex social identities in the cyber realm shape users’ experiences and their interaction with power structures. Feminist analysis can shed light on how gender and other inequalities operate in cyberspace and impact human rights and uniquely impact women and other marginalised groups living in conflict-affected countries. We see the WPS agenda as a starting point for scholarly and policy-focused feminist cyber engagement.

### Perm Do Both – Critical Friend

#### Perm do both—the aff acts as a critical friend to NATO which is key to nuanced understandings that change institutions and avoid co-optation

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Katharine A.M., Lecturer in International Politics at Newcastle University, UK; Matthew, Lecturer in Politics at Sheffield Hallam University, UK; Jesus Ignacio, former Chief of the NATO IMS Office of the Gender Advisor. “Introduction.” NATO, Gender, and the Military: Women Organising from Within. Routledge Studies in Gender and Security. 2019. Pg 5-6. LJS

Much to the benefit of the feminist IR, there are numerous critical engagements and conversations between feminists on approaches to the study of security, war and the institutions that wage them. Sylvester (2013) and Duncanson (2013) acknowledge a tension between what can be broadly described as an ‘anti-militarist’ feminism and what Sylvester calls ‘new’ feminist war studies that seek to centralise the accounts of women as agents within institutions of war (2013: 49) (see also Lobasz and Sjoberg, 2011: 574). Sylvester notes unease between women who self-identify as feminists but depart from common advocacy of peaceful conflict resolution, or a strident anti-militarism. Similarly, Duncanson (2013) identifies a tension between feminists who view militaries as useful in the pursuit of peace (Olsson and Tryggestad, 2001; Kaldor, 2012; Kronsell, 2012) and those who are much more sceptical about the role and place of militaries and militarism (Whitworth, 2004); between those whom she calls ‘feminist sceptics of military intervention’ and ‘feminist sceptics’ (Duncanson, 2013: 2). This tension becomes acute when considering sites of feminist research and the role of feminist researcher: as Sylvester (2013: 39) notes: ‘Gender and war is a very fraught coupling and the men and women who join the institution of war or work within it can put observers in a conundrum: to support them, take no position, look the other way?’ What Sylvester is commenting on is the notion that by centralising institutions of war and the individuals that choose to work within them as a site of feminist analysis, this somehow promotes, reinforces and legitimates those structures. Yet, Kronsell (2005, 2006, 2012) highlights how solely focusing on women at the ‘margins’ of International Relations, on those ‘outside of hegemonic institutions’ such as the military, tends to underestimate the significance of the transformative work of those women who work ‘inside’ such organisations (Kronsell, 2005: 289). In advancing a ‘revitalised’ standpoint theory, Kronsell (2005: 289) also argues that a reluctance to engage with women within hegemonic institutions perpetuates certain assumptions about them: Women within such institutions have been perceived as either co-opted or too few to be representative of women’s knowledge or standpoint. Standpoint theory’s tendency to emphasise knowledge generated by women only in particular ‘women’s spaces’ has led to the implication that an occasional woman with power is either a male in disguise or a mere token. It is not our intention to promote, reinforce or legitimate NATO as an international actor through this book. But it is our intent to offer a feminist critique of its gendered institutional norms, practices and structures by centralising the experience of those women who have worked and continue to work within it. We see our role as ‘critical friends’. In introducing this concept of a ‘critical friend’ we build on the work of Rech et al. (2015: 56). They contend that the study of the military, of militarism, and of processes of militarisation, should not be undertaken solely for its own sake, but should also be guided by the possibility of engagement with the forces and institutions responsible, and should not be bashful about doing so. This is because such institutions are ultimately accountable to the civilian world, and understanding how they function is necessary to critique them (rather than dismiss them) (Enloe, 1993; Rech et al., 2015: 56). Being a ‘critical friend’ means rejecting problem-solving approaches which ‘takes the world as it finds it’ and aims ‘to makes these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–9). Rather, it means adopting a critical approach which calls these institutions into question and accounts for the possibility of their change. In so doing it opens up the possibility for research to be normatively guided (Cox, 1981: 129–30). Being a ‘critical friend’ to military institutions therefore entails engaging in complex and nuanced arguments and situating these in broader political considerations and in more nuanced ways than simplistic ‘pro-military’ or ‘anti-military’ positions are able to accommodate (Rech et al., 2015: 56). It means a commitment to praxis, which necessities engagement. Military institutions are often secretive, complex and contradictory, this means critical agendas can be vulnerable to co-option (as we discuss in Chapter 4). Researchers as ‘critical friends’ therefore need to engage in an ongoing process of reflexivity from the outset of any project.

## Impacts

### A2 Extinction

#### Gender is not the root cause of violence or ontological and cant explain the case -- violence is constructed by many axes of oppression

Olena Hankivsky 12, Professor in the School of Public Policy, Simon Fraser University, June 2012, Women’s health, men’s health, and gender and health: Implications of intersectionality, Social Science & Medicine, http://www.sciencedirect.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/science/article/pii/S0277953612000408

Using an intersectionality framework, researchers have noted the explanatory limitations of single axis designs centered on sex and gender. Cole (2009) has warned that analyses that focus on gender are problematic because they often “implicitly assume a host of other social statuses that usually go unnamed in American culture: middle-class standing, heterosexuality, able-bodiedness and White race” (p. 173). Others have explicated similar limitations. For example, studies in the field of violence (Bent-Goodley, 2007; Craig-Taylor, 2008; Crenshaw, 1995; Nixon & Humphreys, 2010; Sandelowski, Barroso, & Voils, 2009) show that violence against women is not only a matter of gendered power relationships but is co-constructed with racial and class stratification, heterosexism, ageism, and other systems of oppression, some of which may be more salient within such interactions. Research on cardiovascular disease (CVD) (Brister, Hamdulay, Verma, Maganti, & Buchanan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Carr, & Quan, 2007; King, LeBlanc, Sanguins, & Mather, 2006) shows that focussing on sex and gender often obscures the fact that CVD is disproportionately experienced by racial ethnic and low-income groups whose lives are shaped by intersecting processes of differentiation along the lines of age, sex, ethnic group affiliation, socioeconomic class, and geography. Finally, HIV/AIDS research (Dworkin, 2005; Elford, Anderson, Bukutu, & Ibrahim, 2006; Jackson & Reimer, 2008; Meyer, Costenbader, Zule, Otiashvili, & Kirtadze, 2010; Young & Meyer, 2005) demonstrates that gender and sexuality cannot be separated from other axes including race, class, age, religious affiliation, and immigration status and the structural economic, political, and social processes that shape them. For example, in her analysis of surveillance categories for HIV, Dworkin (2005) argues that pushing beyond a singular sex/gender system to explore the simultaneity of race, class, and shifting gender relations is vital to the future of the HIV epidemic and in particular, for making visible bisexual and lesbian transmission risks. Emerging research thus demonstrates that there are many groups which “do not necessarily identify gender oppression as the primary frame through which they understand their lives” (Nixon & Humphreys, 2010, p. 150). In Canada, as in many other jurisdictions, this is especially apparent with growing immigrant populations whose health is primarily affected by dislocation, isolation, loss of identity, culture, and meaningful employment and Aboriginal/Indigenous populations whose health and well-being is largely determined by unresolved colonial injustices and ongoing experiences of racism and poverty (Alfred, 2005; Waldrum, Herring, & Young, 2006).¶ Further, the emphasis on gender (and sex) often leads to a focus on differences between women and men. This helps to explain why so much data continues to be collected, organized, and presented solely around sex and gender differences even when similarities between women and men are demonstrated (e.g. Hyde, 2005; Petersen, 2009), differences among women and among men are often as significant if not more than between women and men (Crawshaw & Smith, 2009; Varcoe, Hankivsky, & Morrow, 2007), and men are sometimes subordinate to some women and some women exercise power over some men (Pease, 2006). Nevertheless, numerous reviews of sex based and gender differences continue to be produced (Gochfeld, 2010; Read & Gorman, 2010). Moreover, even in some frameworks that seek to include considerations of both sex and gender, as in the sex and gender based analysis (SGBA) tool developed in Canada (e.g. Clow et al., 2009), proposed guides construct lines of interrogation that prioritize examinations of similarities and differences between women and men. As Clow et al. (2009) state, “SGBA reminds us to ask questions about similarities and differences among women and men, such as: Do women and men have the same susceptibility to lung disease from smoking? Are women at the same risk as men of contracting HIV/AIDS through heterosexual intercourse? Are the symptoms of heart disease the same in women and men?.” (p. 1). Within this type of construct, differences that are shaped and formed by factors outside of sex and gender are treated as secondary in importance, if at all.

## Alt

### Fails – Policy Key

#### Alt fails – privileges abstraction and distances theory from practice – materiality is not reducible to discourse.

Hudson 15

Heidi, Professor of International Relations and Director of the Centre for Africa Studies at the University of the Free State, “(Re)framing the Relationship between Discourse and Materiality in Feminist Security Studies and Feminist IPE,” POLITICS & GENDER, 11 (2) (2015)

While feminists usually try to ground the meanings that they study, theorizing the mundane or the everyday may very well represent a detour —or even a dead end—if bread-and-butter issues related to the security and economic well-being of ordinary women and men are ignored. What value does feminist theorizing (even if it draws from women’s lived experiences) have in war-affected contexts where meeting immediate needs is paramount? At what point does the theorizing of the body under such circumstances become a means to satisfying intellectual fetishes? Theorizing the everyday is messy because it has to contend with the immediate social setting in which popular culture is inseparable from the economic materiality of the conditions of oppression. In response to this dilemma, my aim is to argue for a productive rather than a reductive relationship between Feminist Security Studies (FSS) and Feminist (International) Political Economy (FPE), achieved through a reframed relationship between discursive subjectivity and a structure-centred materiality. I argue for a more systematic feminist analysis that reunites FPE and cultural FSS critiques. This analytical synthesis is based on an understanding of the co-constituted agency of discourse and materiality underpinned by a postcolonial-feminist attention to the politics of space. After the Cold War, security became a catch-all concept for critical variants of IR, but instead of working against disciplinary fragmentation, “security has settled into each new camp in particularistic ways” (Sylvester 2013, 618). For FSS the main concern is to underscore the conceptual necessity of gender to understanding security. Although scholars have also emphasized the theoretical and methodological diversity of FSS, I contend that there is an implicit hierarchy of sorts when it comes to which critical tradition matters more theoretically or epistemologically—with a subtle but distinct privileging of the discursive as evidenced by the influential contributions of, among others, Judith Butler (1993), Karin Fierke (2013a), Lene Hansen (2006), and Laura Shepherd (2008). FSS thus tends to focus on the gendered, discursive construction of forms of violence with less attention paid to materialities of economic insecurity. In contrast, FPE tends to avoid the security frame and its discursive implications and concentrates more on gender as a social relation of inequality and the gendered effects of capitalism or economic globalization. Poststructuralist scholarship in FSS insists that the discursive is not privileged over the material and that objects in the material world and human subjects both take their forms and agencies relationally, as they are embedded within particular locations. Similarly, gendered and embodied security is theorized to be the outcome of relational processes —performed in, by, and through those relations. Theory thus makes practice (Foucault 1972). Yet, thinking about our bodies as cultural constructs, produced as objects in security discourse, has a high level of abstraction. Before we can analyze discourse about bodies, shouldn’t we first make the bodies from “other worlds,” rooted in everyday struggles of human insecurity, feature in IR? How is attention to contextualized discourses of individuals or groups without considering their basic needs different from what liberal feminists are doing, namely treating those whose security is at stake as abstract, silent, rights-bearing individuals with no culture? Moreover, for all this talk about interactions between language and matter (as if they were equal), “language” remains the star of the show, as evidenced in Karin Fierke’s claim that “embodied security is . . . fundamentally bound up in the interaction between humans and their material environment, both of which are constituted in and through language” (Fierke 2013b, 16). Theoretically, materiality should gain agency through the fact that it cannot ontologically be separated from discursive forces but in practice discourses treat material practices (bodies) as effects (objects) rather than causes (subjects), and consequently maintain agency (Wilcox 2012). A subtle hierarchy is therefore imposed. Reversing the starting point of the inquiry may succeed in troubling dualistic thinking but does not transcend it. We may have thrown the baby out with the bathwater when we privileged the effects of cultural constructions of gender difference at the expense of the material effects of bodies, economic justice, and security (see Fraser 2013). There are clearly limits to discursive analysis, especially when it comes to connecting physical insecurity and the materiality of insecurity linked to structures. We must therefore look to the so-called “new materialisms” on posthumanist agency (Connolly 2013), material feminisms (Hughes 2013), and Feminist IPE. Feminist IPE as a diverse body of scholarship studies structures, social practices, and the meanings of the global political economy (Griffin 2010; Peterson 2007). The emphasis falls on specifically gendered bodies while also foregrounding differences that are based upon material and structural inequalities as well as intersectional relations of disadvantage (e.g., gender, institutionalized racism, or ethnicity). In this regard, FPE may find itself closer than FSS to a radical definition of human security as everyday life experiences embedded in global structures of inclusion and exclusion and can keep FSS honest by guiding it back to a concern with everyday (economic) insecurities.

### Turn – Gender Essentialism

#### Traditional feminist understandings habitually entrench wester notions of gender

Underwood 16— B.A. International Studies, The Ohio State University (Jasmine, “FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND “EPISTEMIC BLANK SPOTS”: ENTRENCHING HEGEMONY?,” Wright State University Graduate School, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send\_file?accession=wright1484344418762762&disposition=inline)

The basic task of dismantling and decentering the current theoretical paradigms of mainstream IR by challenging its “western” origins served as the foundation to call into question the supposed objectivity of knowledge developed within the boundaries of this discipline (Sign Systems, and Knowledge). This ultimately leads to deconstruction of the masculinities, and consequently, the femininities derived from mainstream IR, which challenges the universalism of its principles. These principles are the basis under which knowledge is disseminated within the field and they dominate the ways in which we think about the world. Thus, to deconstruct and challenge these principles then “problematizes” all of the concepts and practices derived from them. When considering how feminist IR challenged and problematized development, this served as the basis for the building tasks of practices and politics. While international relations and the international system advocate for development as benevolent, in practice, this concept has been enacted (at times) with various self-interested outcomes by those in positions of power. Tickner pointedly referred to development as a “western project” and other theorists critiqued the western frame of development models and practices. Furthermore, if one thinks about the politics of development, this concept is complexly used to withhold social goods such as foreign aid or development assistance.¶ The buildings tasks of relationships, identities, and connections are closely intertwined and dependent upon each other, especially in feminist IR. The literature also challenged, developed, and weaved together the various aspects of identity of women around the world. Challenging the views of women in the developing world also involved challenging how women in the developed world view their own status and position. Take, for example, the concepts of complicity and insider/outsider identities. The feminist IR literature strongly asserted that through actions such as underpaid household labor or unfair labor practices used to produce 57 globally-shipped goods (e.g. buying items produced in sweatshops) women have participated in aspects of patriarchy that disadvantage others. Another example is “femocrats” or women in power who condone—or even advocate—certain policies that are steeped in hegemonic masculinity, such as war. These are women that have upheld certain aspects of patriarchy because it is beneficial to maintaining their own power. Thus, it forces women in the developed world to think about their relationship and connection to their counterparts in developing countries, particularly in ways that do not create them as abstract figures. If these women are oppressed, if they are “third world”; if they are disadvantaged, then, those in the “first world” are not disconnected from their position. This oppression did not—and does not—happen by coincidence. Women in the First World/developed countries/Global North bear some responsibility, whether implicitly or explicitly, in maintaining the disadvantaged social status of those outside the west.¶ Furthermore, an interesting aspect of this analysis of feminist IR literature was not in how these pieces talked about women in developing countries or the “Third World,” but in how these women weren’t spoken about. Not in terms of making them invisible, but in not attempting to describe them; not attempting to speak for them, but straying away from one-dimensional or homogenized views of their lives. It seemed that the goal was simply to “trouble” the existing images and ways in which we think about these women and their lives. The task was not necessarily to describe, but instead, to deconstruct. Perhaps, this was a method to counter existing, problematic narratives, but without co-opting the stories of marginalized women for scholarly purposes.¶ The previously identified themes and categories will be carried forward to the second part of the discourse analysis on policy literature. The purpose of the next chapter is to see if any of 58 these objects in feminist IR literature have influenced and/or appear in the discourse of international women’s development policy.¶ Summary When looking at the overall discourse of feminist IR literature, the not only stresses the idea of adding women to IR, but which women are added and whose voices are heard. This is disruptive to the discipline because of its agendered assumptions. The texts repeatedly and purposefully situate gender and international relations within a western context, to serve as a reminder that the international system has a specific sociocultural frame. This creates situated identities within this frame that may have been imposed upon individuals, particularly women in the “Third World”/ “Developing” world/ “Global South.” By giving examples of women’s agency, particularly in reference to women’s movements and civil society, it serves to uncover and build an image of these women separate from “western” created concepts. Often, images of marginalized individuals are depicted in relation to those in power, highlighting the (hierarchical) differences. Telling a plurality of stories decenters the singular frame in which one can see the world.¶ Despite these attempts at disruption, the use of dichotomies shows the power of language and that one can only exist so far “outside the system” (even when aware of its pitfalls). This “discursive slippage” is a result of unconscious, habitual, and inherited language (Hooper, 2001; Runyan & Peterson, 2010). The continued use of western-imposed, hierarchical dichotomies means that uncovering new ways to view international relations requires new language to speak about international relations. Otherwise, feminist IR will disrupt discourse in one context, while entrenching it in another.

#### Feminist international relations impose the idea of “gender” being based upon the “heteronormative binary”.

Chamindra **Weerawardhana** 2017 – Political analyst, PhD in Comparative Politics at Queen's University Belfast, Research in conflict management in deeply divided societies with a special focus on Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. “Profoundly Decolonizing?: Reflections on a Transfeminist Perspective of International Relations”. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/679260>

The field of feminist security studies highlights how “security” is interrelated to issues of gender and sex in many important ways (Wibben and Stern 2014; Hudson 2011, 586; see also Sjoberg 2009; Sjoberg and Martin 2010). Although feminist security studies strongly challenges the dominant, repressive, and invariably patriarchal ways in which national security, international security coalitions, foreign policy priorities, and defence mechanisms are conceived, it is a considerably “restrictive” field. Publications in journals such as Politics and Gender demonstrate that the near-totality of contributors are cis, white, able-bodied women in Western academia. Feminist security studies focuses invariably on the gender binary, thereby limiting its brand of feminism to cis (and largely white) able-bodied women. It is a field that seldom accommodates a diversity of perspectives or includes voices of women of color, Indigenous women, or Trans and queer feminist scholars and activists. This approach to feminist security studies perpetuates a cycle of exclusion and exceptionalism, adjudicating on who gets to articulate what in the field, and who gets academic credence as a “feminist.” Concluding an article on feminist security studies, Hudson (2011, 589) calls upon fellow academics in that research area to avoid inflicting unto others what has been done unto them in the past in the form of exclusionary practices and in defining the boundaries of feminist security studies to say who is in and who is out. In terms of theorizing, critical voices on the potential of feminist security studies to engage with and destabilize gendered power relations are receiving increasing scholarly attention (see, e.g., Åhäll 2016). Yet even such critical voices take a considerably cisgender feminist turn, with subjective and restrictive interpretations of what is implied by “feminist.” In Practice: The Gender Binary as the Status Quo in International Politics The consequences of mostly whitefeminist theorizing of international relations and security studies can be observed in the agendas and targets of supranational organizations, regional bodies, and powerful governments. The UN’s gender policies and strategic goals, as well as those of powerful governments, are structured in a way that perpetuates gender-related conservatisms and norms, which, to borrow from Ahmed (2016, 23), are also heteronorms. The UN’s concept of gender mainstreaming involves ensuring that the goal of gender equality is made central to all activities—policy development, research, advocacy, legislation, resource allocation, planning, implementation, and monitoring of programs and projects (UN Women, n.d.). Many scholars of feminist IR have explored challenges and inconsistencies in the way in which gender mainstreaming is perceived by the UN and other supranational bodies (see, e.g., Youngs 2008; Daly 2005; Rees, 2005; Walby 2005; Perrons, 2005; Beveridge and Nott 2002; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002; True 2003, 2009, 2010). Gender mainstreaming, as it is practiced by the international community, persistently interprets “gender” around the “heteronormative binary” (see Zalewski 2010, 21–22) and consequently regularly ignores interfaces between race, sex, gender, nationality, ethnicity, sexuality, and power (25; see also Jauhola 2010). Today, UN bodies have begun to pay increased attention to Transgender issues through their emphasis on sexual orientation, gender identity/expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC), especially in collaboration with platforms such as the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex Association (ILGA). However, the overall ethos of such engagements continues to be somewhat inconsistent, in that they fail to acknowledge the salient reality that anti- Trans discrimination—if not discrimination against gender identities that do not fall within the binary—is inherently linked to misogyny, patriarchal oppression, and inequities that are at the heart of gender-related oppression, which especially take their toll on underprivileged cis women of color in the Global South, Indigenous peoples across the world, and also women from ethnic minorities in the West.10 In a similar vein, the UN’s women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda is also essentially founded not only upon a narrow and restrictive understanding of gender(s) fixed on the gender binary, but also on the basis of stereotyping (cisgender) women as the vulnerable “other.” Even when discussing women affected by armed conflict, WPS resolutions locate the (cisgender) male soldier as the ultimate referent (Jansson and Eduards 2016, 12). A fast-growing body of work examines the rationale and problems of implementing WPS resolutions (Olonisakin, Barnes, and Ikpe 2011; Gizelis and Olsson 2015; Farr 2011; Barnes 2011; Harrington 2011; Reeves 2012; Adrian-Paul 2012). Scholars of feminist security studies have also critically engaged with the WPS agenda (Pratt and Richter-Devroe 2011; Schnabel and Tabyshalieva 2012; Boyd 2014). Critics highlight that Resolution 1325 does not confront the structural roots of gender inequalities, including entrenched understandings of patriarchy, masculinity, and militarized power (Barnes 2011). Resolution 1325 and the subsequent WPS resolutions (including Resolution 2122 of 2013) largely perceive women through a prism of wartime victimhood (see, e.g., Meger 2016). This logic locates the cis male soldier as the agent of preventing violence against women, and, as scholars have repeatedly pointed out, legitimizes military activity once sexual violence against women is addressed. In sum, the UN’s conception of gender equates cis women and cisnormative femininity with peace and is entrenched in cisnormative gender stereotypes (Shepherd 2008). This reading of women in contexts of armed conflict fails to identify patriarchy as the primary cause of violence against women, which prevents UN resolutions from consistently addressing the exclusion of women and gender-plural people from conflict management initiatives. It also prevents supranational bodies (and governments) from focusing on a logic of addressing the visceral excesses of patriarchal attitudes and developing a consistent logic of women’s empowerment, especially in post-war contexts in the Global South. The problems inherent in the WPS agenda and gender mainstreaming primarily stem from the fact that the very authority that drafts these policy guidelines is also one that is largely spearheaded by influential states with power acquired through centuries of colonization, and by white settler-controlled authorities that are squarely responsible for the human, socioeconomic, cultural, and linguistic genocide of First Peoples, especially women and gender-plural peoples of Turtle Island and elsewhere. Since its inception, the UN has proved to be incapable of addressing atrocities committed by these powers upon non-white peoples. Western superpowers have carte blanche on the international sphere, often justifying their military aggressions and violence in foreign lands on the basis of protectionist discourses along (cis)gender faultlines, such as the often-repeated “objective” of protecting “women and children,” echoing a discourse of masculinist protectionism built upon a patriarchal and hence patronizing understanding of democratic citizenship and world politics. In the face of such discourses, the UN has been conspicuously silent and partaking in the agendas of Western powers. This calls into question the UN’s capability, in its present form, of addressing the challenges facing women/gender minorities in contexts of armed conflict and natural disaster. An effective strategy must be grounded in the recognition of a broader understanding of gender beyond the binary, and a decolonizing logic of empowering cis and Trans women and all other gender-plural people. Most importantly, such an approach must profoundly challenge the logics of warfare as articulated by powerful states and ensure that women and gender-plural people occupy frontline roles in all aspects of conflict management and resolution initiatives. It is in articulating a policy perspective of this nature, with decolonizing, equity, justice, and empowerment at the center, that a Transfeminist approach to IR will gain prime significance. As outlined below, key ideas in Transfeminism, when applied to IR, provide a promising avenue to develop a strongly intersectional, feminist, Global South(s)-focused and decolonizing twenty-first-century perspective on world politics.